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THE 1984 GEORGE ELIOT MEMORIAL LECTURE:
LOVE, KNOWLEDGE AND NARRATION:
GEORGE ELIOT ON OTHER MINDS
By Dr. Richard Freildman B. A. Brandei s;
D. Phil. Oxon. of the University of Western
Australia.

I
'I t was by loving them ... that he knew them; it was
not by knowing them that he loved'1 - such was
Henry lames's legendary conclusion about Balzac
and his characters. lames's point was simple but
important: Balzac was, in his view, able to invest
his characters with a special freedom and
opaqueness because he loved them as one might love
.another person ~ They didn't spring complete and
transparent from a fictional blueprint. 2
James makes a similar point about Trollope, a
writer in whom he elsewhere finds fault. If
Trollope 'was a knowing psychologist, he was so
by grace; he was just and true without apparatus'
and without effort'.3 Creation 'without apparatus'
again suggests an understanding that is intuitive
rather than calculating; an almost inadvertent,
instinctive feeling for the veiled inner worlds of
persons, both in fiction and in life. This is high
praise indeed from a writer who counted himself
among the select group of 'loving' creators of
fictional character. 4
lames was, of course, also one of the early and
. great critics of George Eliot. He met her, reviewed
almost everything she wrote, and learnt a great deal
about 'the art of fiction' from her work. Yet some
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of his best-known judgements about her art are
ambivalent or even openly critical. He suggests,
for instance, that she tended to work
unspontaneously from 'the abstract to the concrete' ,
and that the instinct for the 'irresponsible plastic'S
creation of character was less prominent in her
than in Balzac, Trollope, Turgenev and others.
She depended too little on love; too much on her
formidable powers of abstraction and moral analysis.
Over recent decades George Eliot criticism has
taken the terms of James's strictures and turned
them to George Eliot's advantage. Some of the best
work - passages in Leavis, the extended studies by
Barbara Hardy, W. J. Harvey and Gillian Beer 6
have demonstrated not only that analysis in an Eliot
novel is often profoundly creative, but that her
creation of character is a much less homogeneous
and ponderous thing than James supposed.
I don't intend or need to press this particular point
here. Rather, I wish to recall the related point
that was the subject of my 1984 George Eliot
Memorial Lecture, "George Eliot on Love and
Knowledge". There I argued that an explicit and
often urgent concern with the proprieties of love
and knowledge marks a great deal of George Eliot's
writings; indeed, that it extends beyond her novels
to her short fiction, essays, reviews and letters.
This concern is in some instances 'literary' and is
reminiscent of James's remark about Balzac; but it
is also often more than literary and reflects certain
fears on George Eliot's part about human
relationships. I s it right to seek to know another
person completely? I s it feasible so to know
someone? Where does one draw the line between
loving intimacy and a kind of manipulative expertise
in the inner lives of others? In a remarkable short
30 ,

story published in 1859 George Eliot was to liken
such intrusions to the lifting of a veil. But, as her
early letters indicate, the theme was long in
preparation.
1I
A letter written home by the young Marian Evans
during a stay with friends in Geneva draws an
important distinction. She writes of her hosts that
I feel they are my friends - without
entering into or even knowing the
greater part of my views, they
understand my character, and have
a real interest in me. (G. E. L., 1/328)
'Real interest' - a genuine and solicitous concern for
other people - is implicitly contrasted with what in
another letter she calls 'hard curiosity': 'I hate hard
curiosity' (G. E.L., I I 1/376) she insists in objection
to an unloving and intrusive attitude to the knowledge
of others. Significantly, the theme surfaces again
in a statement of authorial intent. She wishes to
write
something that would contribute to
heighten men's reverence before the
secretsof each other's souls, that
there might be less assumption of
entire knowingness, as a datum from
which inferences are to be drawn.
(G.E.L., 1I1/164)
'Entire knowingness' is a parallel term for 'hard
curiosity': 'inferences', she argues, must to a great
extent be instinctive if they are to honour the dignity
of another person. (I shall discuss some of the
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philosophical implications of this claim presently.)
The novels make the same point on many occasions.
Adam Bede insists that 'the human soul is a very
complex thing' (I :XVI :259) and that we need to strike
a balance between the moral necessities of at least '
partial understanding and the individual's right to a
margin of privacy. The Mill on the Floss picks up
on what the letter cited above calls 'knowingness'.
The narrator observes that
there is nothing more widely misleading
than sagacity if it happens to get on a
wrong scent; and sagacity, persuaded
that men usually act and speak from
distinct motives, with a consciously
proposed end in view, is certain to
waste its energies on imaginary game.
(p. 22).
The passage is important not only in the obvious
sense that it implies a certain impropriety in
intrusi ve enquiry, but because it gives George
Eliot's customary view on what the philosophers
(Anglo-American rather than Continental) call
'intention'. Her writing rests. on the assumption
that 0ther people's 'motives' are obscure and beyond
total reconstruction, but that they are not thereby
wholly indeterminate or entirely resistant to humane
understanding. As we shall see, George Eliot was
not 'doing' what is now called among critics
'deconstruction'. However, she was insisting that
unders'tanding be humane, and that this entails a
preparedness rlot to know certain things in
reJationships of love. Thus Philip Wakem in The
Mill: "I think there are stores laid up in our human
nature that our understandings can make no complete
inventory of" (p. 268). Romola takes a similar - if
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at times inconsistent - line on what it calls 'the
complexities in human things' (1 I:LI I :236}. Of the
tragically complex Savonarola the narrator observes:
The mysteries of human character
have seldom been presented in ·a
way more fitted to check the judgements
of facile knowingness than in Girolamo
Savonarola; but we can give him a
reverence that needs no shutting of the
eyes to fact, if we regard his life as a
drama in which there were great inward
modifications accompanying the outward
changes. (I:XXV:359) .
Once again, the point is that one must steer a course
between shallow and insulting 'knowingness' on the
one hand, and the negligence of not asking certain
tough questions that are necessary to ethical social
life, on the other. The first. of these alternatives
expl-ains the centrality of the word 'reverence' in
George Eliot's moral vocabulary, for reverence (she
hoped) allays the temptations of 'facile knowingness'.
Felix Holt is typical in contrasting reverence and its
synonyms with the language of unfeeling intrusiveness.
Thus Rufus Lyon joins the narrator in finding .
'curiosity' anathema. Lyon shrinks 'even from an
inward enquiry that was too curious' (p.359) and will
not defer to 'the insufferable motive of curiosity'
(p. 399) in others. Not surprisingly, the most
searching and mom~ntous treatments of love and
knowledge come in the masterworks, Middlemarch
and Daniel Deronda. Middlemarch seems (as
Dr. Johnson put it) to find an echo in almost every
bosom, not least that of the poststructuralist critics
who seek evidence in literature for their seemingly
limitless linguistic scepticism. Middlemarch obliges
with a characteristic Eliotean stress on the
33

'difficulty' and 'complexity' of human affairs and on
the dynamic and fluid propensities of the self.
'Character', it asserts, 'is a process and an
unfolding' (I:II :226). But poststructuralists like
J. Hillis-Miller perhaps understate the extent to
which Middlemarch assumes, and indeed illustrates,
that other selves are available to a certain - albeit
a provisional and incomplete - kind of knowing. 7
George Eliot's general position is classically given
in Book I I. Dorothea, having like all people been
'born in moral stupidity', has to acknowledge that
Casaubon is not the man of her imaginings; not simply
the embodied image of her adolescent fantasy life.
She has to 'conceive' that her inadequate husband
has 'an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights
and shadows must always fall with a certain
difference' (I :XXI :323). This passage has been
variously interpreted but I take it to mean that the
otherness of other people is a relatively stable
feature of moral relationships and that it can be
mitigated by the kind of provisional, respectful and
cumulative intimacy that characterise relationships
of love. 'Difference', in this view, is not what it so
often becomes in structuralist and post structuralist
discussion - the touchstone of the anti-humanist
denial of the substantial self - but rather the
condition of creative human relationships. George
Eliot was not so naIve as to think such relationships
wholly unmediated by social convention. On the
contrary, her novels. essays and letters suggest that
various codes (linguistic, ethical, religious,
aesthetic) provide relatively stable contexts within
which people can make partial sense of one another.
But - and this is central to her work - such codes
do not as it were exhaust the individual. Something
'spiritual' goes on within and between people in
relationships of love, and neither they nor we can
entirely explain this. That such an assumption
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strikes some contemporary readers as philosophically
unsophisticated need not automatically invalidate it.
Experience - philosophical and other - suggests that
it is hard to picture rational, ethical societies without
in the first instance taking something like this image
of self for granted.
George Eliot's last novel, Daniel Deronda, further
submits the 'equivalent centre of self' to a searching
spiritual, philosophical and moral investigation.
Daniel, for example, is another character of tact and
reverence. He possesses a 'reverential tenderness'
Cl I I:Ll: 135) towards other people and, in a phrase
reminiscent of Rufus Lyon, wonders whether he should
'obtrude his interest' (I :XVI I :280) upon Mirah Cohen.
Deronda indeed is the unimpeachable - if at times
somewhat implausible - summation of George Eliot's
doctrine of unintrusive love. He has the kind of
knowledge, of other people that James imputes to Balzac
as a creator of character.
III

This doctrine, of course, has deep roots in George
Eliot's life and personality . Those familiar with the
biographies will know the suffering and internal
conflict that gave rise to one of the great declamatory
phrases of Middlemarch's narrative commentary: 'the
terrible stringency of human need' Cl I :XLVI I 1:313)
was a thing this immensely complex arid intense woman
knew at first hand. For her human relationships
were invariably the central feature of both life and
fiction; and her novels reflect her personal struggle
to reconcile 'need'- the t,emptation to claim and know
another person completely - and the contrasting call
to solicitude, reverence, unintrusive acceptance.
I.ndeed, the creative tension that so distinguishes her
work perhaps resides in her having known, with equal
35

intensity, the horror of solitude and the temptation
of a total knowingness. And here her extraordinaryand in some ways aberrant - short story "The Lifted
Veil" assumes great importance.
"The Lifted Veil" is about an intensely needy man who
is cursed with a capacity for total and intrusive
knowledge. I ts 'hero', Latimer, finds that he can
both see into . the future and into the minds of other
people. This nightmare of knowingness compels a
'diseased participation in other people's
consciousness' (301), a 'curse of insight' (340) and,
in what must surely be one of the most momentous
phrases in all of George Eliot's writings, a sense
of the 'fatiguing obviousness' of 'other minds' (319).
Such 'obviousness' is a gothic inversion of
'reverence', 'love', 'delicacy' and solicitude - the
touchstones of George Eliot's fictional humanism.
I t portends a kind of category collapse in which a
great writer is in effect asking what the world would
be like if the things she held to be true were in fact
an insipid and systematic idealisation of t~e real
state of things. The temptation to call this
'deconstruction' should however be resisted. "The
Lifted Veil" is an appalled act of self-criticism and
examination, but it is everywhere shaped by an
urgent and fundamentally coherent artistic intention.
Perha ps one further detail of the story's rather
tortured plot is pertinent here. Thus blighted,
Latimer chooses to marry the one person into whose
mind he does not have the horrific power of
involuntary psychic access. Bertha is at first his
salvation, the 'oasis of mystery in the dreary desert
of knowledge' (301). Eventually, however, the veil
lifts on her mind also. What is revealed is the gothic
inversion of love: a malign and trivial calculator who
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actually seeks her husband's death.
Why should George Uiot write such a thing?
There were no doubt many reasons, some
psychological (her complex feelings about
relationships); othersdrcumstantial (the story
was written at the peak of the embarrassment,
humiliation and insecurity surrounding her
pseudonym). But a furth~r (and related) one may
again connect with the personal and artistic
insecurity that threads its way through her letters.
I n a particularly striking one of these she writes
that 'I fear authors must submit to be something of
monsters not quite simple healthy human beings'
(G. E. L. II 1/119). At his most troubled,
Henry James sometimes envisaged the novelist as a
kind of 'monster' in a moral world. What, after all,
is omniscient narration but an intrusion upon other albeit created - minds? "The Lifted Veil" seems to
look guiltily forward to James on Balzac; but it
seems also to reflect a troubled region of George
Eliot's own life. It is surely significant that she
complained to Herbert Spencer of precisely the
'double consciousness,Bshe attributes to Latimer.
Like a novelist Latimer is a man conflicted by a
special kind of consciousness: he knows all about
the people he would in many respects prefer to
leave in a loving obscurity. Here George Eliot's
legendary psychological realism begins to seem a
less secure thing than is often thought. This was,
after all, a form of narration which encouraged her
to render transparent the mystery she believed to
reside in other people. Her great novels are a
creative response to the problem of knowledge in
life and in narrative art. The letters and "The
Lifted Veil" reveal the extent and the urgency of
this, one of fictional humanism's perennial concerns.
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argument for the liberal humanist position.
John Bayley's The Characters of Love: A Study
in the Literature of Personality (London: Chatto
& Windus, 1960) gives the Jamesian view cited
above in greater detail than James ever attempted.
3. Henry James, Partial Portraits (London and New
York: Macmillan, 1888), p. 105.
4. See his Preface to The Portrait of a Lady in
which he describes the way characters presented
themselves to his imagination. The Preface is
reprinted in The Art of the Novel, ed.
Richard Blackmur (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934).

5. Partial Portraits, p. 51.
6. F. R. Leavi s, The Great Tradition (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1948); Barbara Hardy, The
Novels of Geor e Eliot: A Stud in Form-(London: Athlone Press, 19 3 ; W. J. Harvey,
The Art of George Eliot (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1961); Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots:
Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, Geor e
Eliot and Nineteenth-Centur Fiction London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 19 3).

s

7. See especially two of Hillis-Miller's essays on
Middlemarch : "Narrative and History", ELH,
Vol. 41 (Fall 1974) pp 455-73, and "Optic and
Semiotic in Middlemarch" in The Worlds of
Victorian Fiction, ed. J erome H. Buckley
(Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1975).
This deconstructive view of the self in fiction
might be contrasted with two important works that
propose a theory of the self as a narrative unity:
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Barbara Hardy, Tellers and Listeners: The
Narrative Imagination (London: Athlone Press,
1975), and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue:
A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth,
1981).
8.

Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography, 2 Vols.
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1904),
Vol. 1, p.459.
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